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ABSTRACT
Total factor productivity (TFP) diﬀers greatly across countries. In this paper, I provide a novel
rationalization for these diﬀerences. I consider two environments, one in which enforcement is
f u l la n dt h eo t h e ri nw h i c he n f o r c e m e n ti sl i m i t e d . I nb o t hs e t t i n g s ,m a n u f a c t u r e dg o o d sc a nb e
produced using a high-TFP technology or a low-TFP technology; there is a ﬁxed cost associated
with adoption of the former. I suppose that the ﬁxed cost is suﬃciently small that adoption takes
place in a symmetric Pareto optimum in the limited-enforcement setting. Under this condition, I
prove two results. First, adoption takes place in all Pareto optima in the full-enforcement setting.
Second, adoption may not take place in a Pareto optimum in the limited-enforcement setting, if
the division of social surplus is suﬃciently unequal. I conclude that limited enforcement and high
inequality interact to create particularly strong barriers to riches (in the language of Parente and
Prescott (1999, 2000).
∗I thank Jonathan Eaton, Tom Holmes, Barbara McCutcheon, and seminar participants at Boston University,
the University of Illinois, the University of Pittsburgh, and University of Western Ontario for their comments.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.1. Introduction
There are enormous diﬀerences in total factor productivity (TFP) across countries.
Parente and Prescott (1999, 2000) argue that these diﬀerences are substantially due to par-
ticular economic institutions in low-TFP countries. In their language, these institutions
are barriers to the adoption of superior technologies. From the point of view of standard
economic reasoning, these barriers are puzzling. Institutions are endogenous. Why would
societies choose to use institutions that lead to such ineﬃcient means of production?
In this paper, I address this question. I consider two diﬀerent types of environments:
one with full enforcement and one with limited enforcement. In the latter environment,
agents can at any time walk away from any societal arrangement and consume their original
endowments; in the former, they cannot.1 I look at Pareto optimal allocations of resources
in the two economies, and prove two results about them.
The ﬁrst result is that if technology adoption occurs in a symmetric Pareto optimum in
the economy with limited enforcement, it occurs in all Pareto optima in the economy with full
enforcement. Making enforcement full can only make adoption of technology more attractive.
The second result concerns the eﬀects of inequality. In the society with limited enforcement,
the adoption decision diﬀers across Pareto optima depending on the distribution of the social
surplus. In particular, if the distribution of the social surplus is extremely unequal, adoption
is less likely to occur than if the distribution is egalitarian. Thus, I conclude that the key
building blocks for barriers to riches are limited enforcement and suﬃciently high inequality.
Limited enforcement is a simple way to model a substantive problem in actual economies.
1In the language of implementation theory, agents face ex-post individual rationality constraints in the
environment with limited enforcement. I use the term “limited enforcement” to highlight the nature of the
technological limitation in the environment.Especially in countries with a large agrarian sector, it is relatively costly to monitor people’s
incomes. These costs make it diﬃcult for governments to collect taxes from its citizens. By
assuming that agents can walk away with their original endowments, I take this problem to
an extreme: I am essentially assuming that income tax collection is impossible.
It is important to emphasize that despite my use of Pareto optimality, I intend these
results to be positive, not normative. Some economists use the terms “good” and “Pareto
optimal” equivalently. I do not. The important property of a Pareto optimal institution is
that it has a special kind of robustness: any attempt to change societal institutions that lead
to Pareto optimal allocations will be met with resistance by some interest group. In this
sense, the barriers to adoption that I identify are especially strong.
The technical speciﬁcs are as follows. I construct an environment with two goods, cars
and food. There are two possible constant marginal-cost technologies to produce cars. I term
the technology with the higher marginal cost, primitive, and the technology with the lower
marginal cost, advanced. There is a ﬁxed cost associated with using the latter technology
which I call the cost of adoption. Agents have identical ex-ante preferences over cars and food,
but are subject to a preference shock that gives them ex-post diﬀerences in their willingness
to substitute food for cars. Importantly, the realization of the preference shock is private
information.
There are two versions of the environment. In the ﬁrst, there is full enforcement, so
that agents can commit ex-ante (pre-preference shock) to a social contract. In this economy,
agents who do not buy cars may be forced to give up food to pay for technological adoption.
In the second, there is only limited enforcement. Agents can walk away ex-post with their
endowments of food. In this latter environment, it is impossible to tax food away from agents
2w h od on o tb u yc a r s .
I parameterize the latter environment so that it is Pareto optimal to adopt the ad-
vanced technology if the distribution of societal surplus is egalitarian. I then show that if
enforcement is instead full, it is Pareto optimal to adopt the advanced technology in all
Pareto optima (regardless of the distribution of societal surplus). In contrast, in the limited-
enforcement environment, in a Pareto optimum with a suﬃciently unequal division of surplus,
adoption does not take place.
The intuition behind the results is simple. When enforcement is limited, societal sur-
plus can only be transferred from one group of agents to another by charging the former group
a high price for cars. Thus, the enforcement limits reduce the number of consumers of cars,
which reduces the incentive for society to choose to adopt the advanced technology. Higher
inequality increases the need to transfer societal surplus across agents. Hence, inequality and
enforcement limits interact to further reduce the incentives for society to adopt the advanced
technology.
Monopoly is often identiﬁed as a key force that interferes with the adoption of new tech-
nologies. I go on to look at the properties of monopoly in the limited-enforcement economy.
Speciﬁcally, I assume that there is a single ﬁrm which owns the two production technologies.
The shareholders of the ﬁrm make production and pricing decisions so as to maximize their
utility (their preferences are identical at the time decisions are made, so a unanimity principle
applies).
Is h o wt h a ta sl o n ga st h eﬁrm is allowed to oﬀer a price discount to its own sharehold-
ers, the monopolistic outcome is always Pareto optimal. However, the monopolistic outcome
may or may not feature adoption. If all agents are shareholders in the monopoly, then adop-
3tion does take place. If only a small fraction of agents are shareholders, then adoption does
not take place.
This paper is largely motivated by the recent work of Parente and Prescott (1999,
2000). Like Holmes and Schmitz (1995), they argue that particular institutions (such as
protection of monopoly rights) can lead to non-adoption of superior technologies. They
abstract from the question of why societies continue to use these institutions even though
they are leading to huge losses in social welfare. It is this open question that I address.
The key friction in my analysis is limited enforcement. Others have shown how en-
forcement limitations can aﬀect the nature of eﬃcient production. See, for example, Mailath
and Postlewaite (1990)’s work on public goods provision, Marcet and Marimon (1992)’s work
on growth, and Cooley, Marimon, and Quadrini (2000)’s work on business cycles. A crucial
feature of my analysis is that enforcement limitations have a greater impact on Pareto op-
tima in which societal surplus is distributed unequally. This point also emerges in studies of
eﬃcient dynamic risk-sharing with limited enforcement (see Kocherlakota (1996)).
2. Environment
In this section, I describe the basic economic environment.
There is a unit measure of agents and there are two goods, labelled food and cars
respectively. Food is divisible and cars are not.
All agents have identical preferences. They are expected-utility maximizers, with
cardinal utility function over cars (c) and food (x) given by:
vmin(c,1) + x
Here, v is a random parameter which is independent across all agents, with a continuous
4probability density function f and a cumulative distribution function F. The support of v is
equal is an interval [vmin,v max] in the nonnegative extended reals (so vmax could be inﬁnity).
All agents are initially endowed with X units of food, where X>v max. There are two
types of technologies available to turn food into cars2.T h eﬁrst transforms γH units of food
into 1 car; the second transforms γL units of food into 1 car, where γH > γL. Ic a l lt h eﬁrst
technology primitive and the second technology advanced. A key feature of the environment
is that there is a ﬁxed cost Ψ (per-capita!) of adopting the advanced technology. I refer to
this cost as being the cost of adoption.
To simplify the analysis, I assume that γL >v min; the results can easily be extended
to environments in which this restriction is not satisﬁed.
There are three stages in the environment. In the ﬁrst stage, the technology choice is
made. In the second stage, agents learn their realization of v. The realization of v is private
information to the aﬀected agent. In the third stage, two agents receive their endowments of
food, and production/consumption both take place.
I want to consider two versions of the above physical and informational setting. The
ﬁrst is a full-enforcement environment (labelled FE in what follows). Here, any agent can
only leave the society with his X units of food before knowing the realization of his preference
parameter. No departing agent can transform food into cars.
The second environment is a limited-enforcement environment (labelled LE). In this
setting, an agent can costlessly leave the society with his X units of food after learning the
realization of his preference parameter. Again, a departing agent cannot transform food into
2An equivalent formulation is to have agents endowed with time, which they can transform into food on
their own, and have the two technologies convert time into cars.
5cars.
3. Incentive-Feasible Allocations
In this section, I build some formal language to describe what is achievable in the two
societies. I assume throughout that there are only two distinguishable groups, 1 and 2, of
households, and a measure θi of the group i agents. Note that the two groups of households
are identical in terms of preferences and enforcement constraints. Without loss of generality,
assume θ1 ≤ θ2.
Given this assumption, an allocation is a 5-tuple (c1,x 1,c 2,x 2,δ) such that:
ci :[ vmin,v max] → {0,1},i∈ {1,2}
xi :[ vmin,v max] → [0,∞),i∈ {1,2}
δ ∈ {0,1}
Here, ci is the group i’s consumption of cars (dependent on utility parameter v),x i is the
group i’s consumption of food, and δ is the choice of technology (δ =1is equivalent to
choosing to adopt the advanced technology). An allocation is feasible if it satisﬁes:












This condition guarantees that the per-capita amount of food exceeds the amount required
to produce the allocated cars, the amount needed for the allocated food, and the amount
needed to adopt the advanced technology.
6In both environments, information and enforcement limitations aﬀe c tw h a ti sa c h i e v -
able. It is straightforward to show that the Revelation Principle (Myerson (1979)) applies to
this environment. In environment FE, an allocation is incentive-compatible if it satisﬁes:
vci(v)+xi(v) ≥ vci(v
0)+xi(v
0) for all v,v




for i =1 ,2. The ﬁrst condition requires truth-telling, and the second condition is an ex-




0) for all v,v
0 in [vmin,v max]
[vci(v)+xi(v)] ≥ X for all v in [vmin,v max].
The latter condition is an ex-post participation constraint.
In either environment, an allocation is incentive-feasible if it is simultaneously incentive-
compatible and feasible. Finally, an incentive-feasible allocation is deﬁn e dt ob eP a r e t oo p -
timal if there is no other incentive-feasible allocation that provides as much utility to both
groups of agents and more utility to one group.
The following lemma delivers a simple characterization of incentive-feasible allocations.
Lemma 1. In environment FE, an allocation (c,x,δ) is incentive-feasible if and only:
ci(v)=1if vmax ≥ v ≥ pi
7ci(v)=0if v<p i
xi(v)=X + ti − ci(v)pi
where:
pi ∈ [vmin,v max]






θi(1 − F(pi))(γLδ +( 1− δ)γH − pi)+Ψδ ≤ 0
Z vmax
pi
(v − pi)f(v)dv + ti ≥ 0 for i =1 ,2
An allocation is incentive-feasible in environment LE if and only if it satisﬁes the
above conditions and ti ≥ 0 for i =1 ,2.
Proof. It is straightforward to show that any allocation which satisﬁes these conditions is
incentive-feasible. It is more diﬃcult to prove the converse. Consider an arbitrary incentive-
compatible allocation (c,x,δ). I ﬁrst prove that there exists pi in [vmin,v max] and ti in [pi −
X,∞) that satisfy the ﬁrst two conditions in the theorem. Let Cij = {v|ci(v)=j}.
Suppose ﬁrst that Ci1 =[ vmin,v max] for some i. Truth-telling implies that xi(v)=xi(v0)
for almost all v,v0 in S. Then, deﬁne pi = vmin and ti = xi(v) − X + pi. These satisfy the
conditions in the theorem. The proof is similar for Ci0 = S.
Suppose instead that v is in Ci1 and v0 is in Ci0. Then, truth-telling implies that
xi(v0)=x0
i for all v0 in Ci0 and xi(v)=xi for all vin Ci1. Deﬁne ti = x0
i − X, and deﬁne
pi = x0
i − xi. Suppose v0 >p i;then, a type v0 should claim to be a type v. Suppose instead
that v<p i; then a type v should claim to be a type v0.
8This proves that ci(v)=1 {vmax≥v≥pi}, and that xi(v)=X + ti − pici(v). The other
conditions follow from feasibility, and the ex-ante participation constraint.
In environment LE, xi(v)+vci(v) ≥ X, which is equivalent to ti−pici(v)+vci(v) ≥ 0
for almost all v in S,o rti ≥ 0.
According to this characterization, in an incentive-feasible allocation, there is a price pi
for cars for each group i. Agents choose whether or not to pay that price, depending on their
realization of v. The proceeds of these sales are used to defray the costs of producing the cars,
and distributed (via the transfers t1 and t2) among the various agents. In environment (LE),
agents who have v ≤ pi must receive a nonnegative amount of food, or they will walk away
after learning their utility parameter. Henceforth, I describe incentive-feasible allocations in
both environments by the associated 5-tuple (p1,p 2,t 1,t 2,δ).
4. Main Results
In this section, I derive the main results. The results concern the adoption decision
in two diﬀerent Pareto optima in the limited enforcement economy and in arbitrary Pareto
optima in the full enforcement economy.
The ﬁrst Pareto optimum in economy LE that I consider is an egalitarian Pareto
optimum in which all agents share social surplus evenly. It is an allocation (p,p,t,t,δ) which





(v − p)f(v)dv + t
s.t. (δγL +( 1− δ)γH − p)(1 − F(p)) + t + Ψδ ≤ 0
s.t. vmin ≤ p ≤ vmax, 0 ≤ t<∞,δ ∈ {0,1}
9In this problem, the planner maximizes the typical agent’s utility, subject to the resource
constraint, and subject to the inequality restrictions on (p,t). Note that t ≥ 0, reﬂecting the
limited enforcement in the environment.
It is trivial to see that the resource constraint binds in this maximization problem.






(v − p)f(v)dv +( 1− F(p))(p − γLδ − γH(1 − δ)) − Ψδ
vmin ≤ p ≤ vmax
0 ≤ (1 − F(p))(p − γLδ − γH(1 − δ)) − Ψδ
Here, the objective is the sum of two pieces which can be interpreted as consumer and
producer surplus respectively (where we think of F as being a demand curve). In keeping
with this interpretation, deﬁne:
PS(δ)=m a x
p (1 − F(p))(p − γLδ − γH(1 − δ)) − Ψδ
to be the producer surplus associated with adoption decision δ. This is the net amount of
food generated by producing a car for each agent with v ≥ p in exchange for p units of food.
The following lemma shows that if adoption of the advanced technology increases
producer surplus, then adoption also increases the sum of consumer and producer surplus.
Lemma 2. Suppose PS(δ) > 0 for all δ ∈ [0,1], and PS(1) >P S (0). Then, δ =1in an
egalitarian Pareto optimum in environment LE.





(v − p)f(v)dv +( 1− F(p))(p − γLδ − γH(1 − δ)) − Ψδ
0 ≤ (1 − F(p))(p − γLδ − γH(1 − δ)) − Ψδ
vmin ≤ p ≤ vmax
the total surplus for a given adoption decision δ. Here, I artiﬁcially allow δ to lie in the unit
interval. Clearly, δ =1in the egalitarian Pareto optimum if and only if TS LE(1) >TS LE(0).
Note that the objective function in this deﬁnition is equivalent to:
Z vmax
p
(v − δγL − (1 − δ)γH)dF(v) − Ψδ
and so is strictly decreasing in p. This immediately implies that the solution p∗(δ) to the
maximization problem is the smallest value of p that satisﬁes the constraint with equality.
Also, the monotonicity of the objective also implies that any p that lies in the constraint set
is strictly larger than the solution p∗(δ).
Next, consider the maximization problem in the deﬁnition of producer surplus. Be-
cause producer surplus is positive, we know that if pPS(δ) solves the producer surplus problem,
pPS(δ) is greater than p∗(δ).
B yt h ee n v e l o p et h e o r e m :
TS
0
LE(δ)=[ ( 1− F(pTS(δ))(γH − γL) − Ψ](1 + λ(δ))
where λ(δ) is the multiplier on the constraint. Similarly:
PS
0(δ)=( 1− F(pPS(δ)))(γH − γL) − Ψ
But, pPS(δ) >p TS(δ), and so PS0(δ) <TS 0(δ) for all δ. The lemma follows.
11The intuition behind the proof is simple. The eﬀect of technology adoption is to reduce
the marginal cost of production for every unit produced. Maximizing total surplus necessarily
involves giving cars to more people than maximizing producer surplus alone. Hence, the eﬀect
of technology adoption on total surplus is larger than for producer surplus.
In what follows, I maintain the following two assumptions:
A1. δ =1in the egalitarian Pareto optimum
A2.PS (1) − PS(0) < 0
These assumptions say that technology adoption is worthwhile according to total surplus, but
not worthwhile according to producer surplus. Note that Lemma 2 implies that the converse
cannot be true.
I now turn to considering adoption in the full enforcement environment. The next
result is that under assumption (A1), the advanced technology is adopted in all Pareto optima
in environment FE, regardless of the distribution of societal surplus.
Proposition 1. Under assumption (A1), in the environment with full enforcement, the ad-
vanced technology is adopted in any Pareto optimal allocation.






+(1 − F(p))(p − γLδ − γH(1 − δ)) − Ψδ}
In the solution to this problem, p = γLδ +( 1− δ)γH.T h i si m p l i e st h a tTS(0) = TS LE(0),
12and TS(1) >T S LE(1). (See the Proof of Lemma 2 for the deﬁnition of TS LE.) Hence,
TS(1) − TS(0) > 0 (by assumption A1). Note that:
TS
0(δ)=( 1− F(γLδ +( 1− δ)γH)))(γH − γL) − Ψ
Now, consider a Pareto optimal allocation (p1,p 2,t 1,t 2,δ) that delivers utilities (u1,u 2)
to the two groups. Given δ, such an allocation must be the minimal cost way of providing
these utilities; if it isn’t, then we can change to a lower-cost way of providing these utilities,
and hand out the extra resources to one of the two groups. Let RC(δ,u 1,u 2) be the minimal
resource cost of delivering ex-ante utility ui to group i:








(v − pi)f(v)dv + ti = ui,i=1 ,2
ti + X ≥ pi,i=1 ,2
(As in the deﬁnitions of total and producer surplus, let δ ∈ [0,1].)
I claim in a solution to this cost minimization problem, pi ≤ γLδ +( 1− δ)γH for
i =1 ,2. The ﬁrst order conditions to this problem are:
θi(1 − F(pi)) + f(pi)θi(γLδ +( 1− δ)γH − pi)=( 1− F(pi))λi + ηi
λi − θi + ηi =0
where λi is the multiplier on the utility constraint for group i agents, and ηi is the multiplier
13on the resource constraint for group i agents. Together, these imply that:
f(pi)θi(γLδ +( 1− δ)γH − pi)=ηiF(pi) ≥ 0
Hence, if p∗
i(δ,u 1,u 2) is part of the solution to the cost-minimization problem, p∗
i(δ,u 1,u 2) ≤
γLδ + γH(1 − δ).




θi(γL − γH)(1 − F(p
∗
i(δ,u 1,u 2))) − Ψ
But because the solution p∗
i(δ,u 1,u 2) is no larger than (δγL +( 1− δ)γH):
|RCδ(δ,u 1,u 2)| ≥ TS
0(δ)
for all δ. It follows that:
RC(0,u 1,u 2) − RC(1,u 1,u 2)
>T S (1) − TS(0)
> 0
In environment FE,the ﬁxed cost of adoption is paid by lump-sum transfers, instead
of through the car price as in environment LE. This means that there is no necessity in
environment FE to incur the “welfare triangle” social cost associated with having car prices
above marginal cost. It follows that it is always Pareto optimal in environment FEto provide
a car to at least as many agents as in the egalitarian Pareto optimum in environment LE.
The gain to adoption is proportional to the fraction of agents who receive cars; hence, there
14are larger gains to adoption when minimizing resource costs than when maximizing total
surplus.
Finally, I consider a second Pareto optimum in environment LE, the maximal-inequality
Pareto optimum. In this Pareto optimum, all of the surplus is given to the smaller group of









(v − p2)f(v)dv + t2 ≥ 0
2 X
i=1
θi(1 − F(pi))[δγL +( 1− δ)γH − pi]+
2 X
i=1
θiti + Ψδ ≤ 0
vmin ≤ pi ≤ vmax,0 ≤ ti < ∞,δ ∈ {0,1}
In other words, we maximize group 1 agents’ utility, subject to group 2 agents’ utility being
willing to go along with the contract rather than simply consuming their food, and subject
to the resource constraint.
Note that in this problem, the ex-ante participation constraint is implied by the in-
equality restrictions on p2 and t2, and so we can drop it. As well, it is trivial that in any
optimum, t2 =0 . By substituting the resource constraint into the objective, and multiply-







(v − p1)f(v)dv +( 1− F(p1))[p1 − δγL − (1 − δ)γH]
+θ2(1 − F(p2))[p2 − δγL − (1 − δ)γH] − Ψδ
s.t. vmin ≤ pi ≤ vmax,δ ∈ {0,1}




(v − p1)f(v)dv +( 1− F(p1))[δγL +( 1− δ)γH − p1] − Ψδ
and is the total surplus to the group 1 agents of producing cars at cost [δγL +(1−δ)γH] and
selling them to group 1 agents at price p1. The second piece is:
(1 − F(p2))[δγL +( 1− δ)γH − p2] − Ψδ
This is the producer surplus of selling cars to group 2 agents at price p2.
If θ1 is suﬃciently small, then the second piece of the objective dominates, and, because
of A2, it is no longer optimal for group 1 agents to set δ =1 . Intuitively, the group 1 agents
are both consumers of cars and monopolists in the sale of cars. If θ2 is suﬃciently large
relative to θ1, the monopolistic motive dominates their problem.
This kind of thinking leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Under Assumption (A2), in the environment with limited enforcement, if θ1
is suﬃciently near 0, then the primitive technology is used in any maximal-inequality Pareto
optimum.
Proof. Let V (δ) be the objective in P2 for a given δ, given that we maximize with respect
to p1 and p2. Then:










(v − p2)f(v)dv +( 1− F(p1))(p1 − γH)]
16+θ2 max
p2 (1 − F(p2))(p2 − γL)
−θ2 max
p2 (1 − F(p2))(p2 − γH)
−Ψ
Hence, for θ1 suﬃciently small:
V (1) − V (0) < 0
and δ =0is optimal.
Thus, in a world with limited enforcement, a suﬃciently unequal Pareto optimum will
feature non-adoption. There are two key ingredients to this result. First, because of limited
enforcement, it is not possible to share social surplus across all agents. Second, because of
inequality, the objective of the planner is quite diﬀerent from the goal of maximizing total
societal surplus.
5. Non-Adoption of Arbitrarily Good Technologies
The above results would be uninteresting if they relied on the adoption cost Ψ’s being
very large while the gap between γH and γL is near zero. The situation in the world appears
to be exactly the opposite: technologies have very diﬀerent productivity levels and adoption
costs appear to be small.
In this section, I address this concern. I show that Assumptions A1 and A2 can hold
for arbitrarily large values of (γH − γL),a sl o n ga sd e m a n di ss u ﬃciently inelastic. Consider
the following sequence of economies, indexed by n:
Fn(ν)=1 − ν
−1−1/n,ν ≥ 1




Ψn = Ψ,0 < Ψ < 1
We can think of Fn as being a demand curve with elasticity (1+1/n). It is easy to show (using
L’Hopital’s Rule) that as n goes to inﬁnity, γHn converges to inﬁnity, so that the primitive




n = PS(1) − PS(0) + Ψ
=m a x
p≥1 p(1 − Fn(p)) − max










Ic a ns h o wt h a tf o rn arbitrarily large, ∆prod
n < Ψ < ∆tot
n . Hence, for n large, assumptions
A1 and A2 are satisﬁed. There is a Pareto optimum in which the advanced technology is not
adopted, even though γHn is arbitrarily large.








vfn(v)dv + γHn(1 − F(γHn))]
= lim
n→∞[n





18and so limn→∞ ∆tot
n = ∞. Also, note that:
∆
prod
n =m a x
p≥1 p(p
−1/n−1) − max









By using the ﬁrst order conditions, the optimal p for a monopolist using the primitive tech-
nology is given by:
(n + 1)(1 − n
−0.5)
−n =a r gm a x




Hence, as n grows large, the optimal mark-up for a monopolist gets bigger (because demand
is getting less elastic). It follows that:
∆
prod















Along this sequence of economies, γHn converges to inﬁnity. However, because demand
is getting less elastic, ∆prod
n eventually falls below Ψ, although ∆tot
n stays above Ψ. Thus, there
are economies with arbitrarily large diﬀerences in costs between the two technologies, in which
the primitive technology is used in some Pareto optimal allocations.
6. Monopoly and Foreign Competition
In this section, I consider two diﬀerent trading arrangements within the context of
environment LE. In both arrangements, there is a single ﬁrm which owns the two production
19technologies. The ﬁrm commits publicly to an adoption and pricing decision before agents
know the realization of their preference parameters.
Ak e yd i ﬀerence between my formulation of monopoly and the usual formulation is
that the ﬁrm makes its adoption/pricing choices so as to maximize shareholder utility, not
shareholder value. Because all agents have the same preferences, their decision is unanimous.
I assume that the ﬁrm is able to charge diﬀerent prices to shareholders and non-shareholders.
I next consider the impact of foreign competition on the economy. In particular, given
that a particular monopolistic arrangement is in place, I ask whether opening the economy
to outside cheap provision of cars makes all agents better oﬀ.
A. Monopoly in the Closed Economy
Given assumptions (A1) and (A2), I consider two monopolistic arrangements which
diﬀer in the speciﬁcation of who owns the ﬁrm. In the ﬁrst arrangement, the ﬁrm is evenly





(v − p)f(v)dv +( 1− F(p))(p − δγL − (1 − δ)γH) − δΨ
But this is simply the egalitarian Pareto optimum problem, with the resource constraint
substituted into the objective. Under assumption (A1), in the solution to this problem,
δ =1 . This monopolist chooses to adopt the advanced technology.
In the second arrangement, a measure θ1 of the agents own the ﬁrm. The other (1−θ1)






(v − p1)f(v)dv + θ1(1 − F(p1))(p1 − δγH − (1 − δ)γL)+
+(1 − θ1)(1 − F(p2))(p2 − δγL − (1 − δ)γH) − δΨ
20But this maximization problem is the same as the maximal-inequality Pareto problem. Again,
the monopolistic outcome is Pareto optimal. However, if θ1 is suﬃciently small, so that ﬁrm
ownership is concentrated in a few hands, then the ﬁrm will choose not to adopt.
Thus, monopolistic outcomes are always Pareto optimal in this setting. There is a
welfare triangle in the latter arrangement (because p2 is higher than marginal cost). However,
the enforcement limits mean that this triangle cannot be distributed to shareholders, and so
it is not possible to create a Pareto superior outcome.
B. Foreign Competition: Pareto Improving?
I again consider the latter monopolistic arrangement, in which the monopoly is closely
held. Suppose there is a world market for cars, in which agents can trade γL units of food for
a car. Hence, in this world market, technology adoption has already taken place. Assuming
that opening up to the world market is costless, can the society eﬀect a Pareto improvement
by doing so?
The answer to this question depends exactly on how opening up to world markets
works. Suppose ﬁrst that only the monopolistic ﬁrm is allowed to trade with the world
market. Then, trade with the world market is Pareto-improving. In essence, the monopolistic
ﬁrm is able to switch to the advanced technology without paying the adoption cost Ψ. The
ﬁrm can charge the same prices, and make more proﬁts; the shareholders are strictly better
oﬀ and the non-shareholders are no worse oﬀ.
But suppose instead that any agent can trade with the world market. All of the non-
shareholders are better oﬀ, because they can buy cars at the cheaper price of γL. However,
because enforcement is limited, there is no way to transfer any of these beneﬁts to the
21shareholders.
T h es h a r e h o l d e r sf a c et w oe ﬀects. As consumers, they are better oﬀ because the price
for cars is now γL instead of γH. As producers, though, they are worse oﬀ because they lose
monopoly proﬁts from the non-shareholders. As long as the ﬁrm is held by a suﬃciently small
fraction of the population, the latter eﬀect dominates, and the shareholders are made worse
oﬀ b yo p e n i n gu pt of o r e i g nt r a d e .
Thus, there will be no resistance to allowing the monopolistic ﬁrm to trade with the
world market, as long as no other agent can. Under this scheme, the domestic ﬁrm switches
from being a domestic producer of cars to a monopolistic middleman for foreign cars. In
contrast, shareholders of a closely held monopoly will resist the alternative scheme of allowing
all agents to trade with the world market.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, I consider an economic environment with a key friction: the inability
to collect taxes from non-buyers of manufactured goods. I show that in societies of this
type, adoption of an advanced manufacturing technology may not occur in Pareto optimal
allocations in which societal surplus is concentrated in relatively few hands. Thus, social costs
associated with income tax collection, combined with a suﬃciently high degree of inequality,
can generate especially strong barriers to adoption of superior technologies.
The basic intuition behind these results is simple. Consider a country in which a small
ruling elite receives the proﬁts from producing and selling manufactured goods. Will this
elite pay a small ﬁxed cost to adopt a superior production technology? The answer depends
on the elite’s ability to tax. If the elite cannot impose taxes, then it ﬁnds adoption optimal
22only if increases in producer surplus are larger than the cost of adoption. However, if taxes
are possible, then the elite can extract consumer surplus; it will make the adoption decision
by comparing the cost of adoption to the gain in total surplus. The gain in total surplus may
be much larger than the gain in producer surplus, especially if demand elasticity is low.
I believe that the results can be extended in several directions. First, imposing a weaker
form of limited enforcement, in which agents can walk away with only a positive fraction of
their food endowments, should not aﬀect the results. However, in this setting, monopolistic
outcomes may not be Pareto optimal unless the monopolistic ﬁrm is subsidized or can use a
two-part pricing scheme. Second, I conjecture that the results are valid if agents can consume
arbitrary amounts of cars (instead of 0 and 1). The structure of incentive-feasible allocations
becomes more complex, because they are based on sophisticated price/quantity schedules.
However, as long as it is not possible to fully extract consumer surplus from car consumers
using such schedules, the results will still be valid.
In this paper, I have emphasized the impact on technology adoption of diﬃculties
in income taxation. Of course, in reality, there is an opposite feedback from the level of
development of a society to its ability to collect taxes. Understanding the interaction between
these two forces is an interesting topic for future research.
The analysis has at least two robust empirical implications. First, the model predicts
that low-TFP countries should have high inequality, and should have limited taxation powers.
Second, the discussion in Section 5 indicates that barriers to adoption should be especially
pronounced for goods with low demand elasticities. These facts are qualitatively consis-
tent with the existence of barriers in textiles in India documented by Parente and Prescott
(1999) and Clark (1987). However, it would be interesting to investigate these predictions
23quantitatively in a more elaborate version of the basic structure set forth in this paper.
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